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Detail
ArtikelManagerial Opportunism During Corporate Litigation  
Oleh: Haslem, Bruce
Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 60 no. 4 (Aug. 2005), page 2013-2042.
Topik: CORPORATE; studies; litigation; court decisions; settlements & damages; economic models; agency theory; rates of return; statistical analysis
Fulltext: p 2013.pdf (143.67KB)
Ketersediaan
  • Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi)
    • Nomor Panggil: JJ88
    • Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0)
    • Tandon: tidak ada
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Isi artikelUsing a large sample of litigation events involving publicly listed defendants, we document a surprising fact. The resolution of litigation through a court's decision dominates settlement of litigation from the shareholders' point of view, even when the firm loses. We develop a model using agency costs within the firm to explain why the market views settlement as a negative outcome on average and find empirical evidence supporting the implications of the model. Specifically, firms with weak corporate governance settle litigation more quickly, and the market reacts more negatively to settlements involving firms with higher agency costs.
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