The Politics of Bank Supervision  

Oleh:

Sukarman, Widigdo

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah nasional - terakreditasi DIKTI
Dalam koleksi: Journal of Indonesian Economy & Business (Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia) vol. 26 no. 1 (Jan. 2011), page 10-24.
Topik: path-dependence; bank supervision; politics; country-specific

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II77 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

The bank supervision function and efficacy of monetary policy are often a trade-off for the central bank. An increasingly integrated financial system and the occurrence of bank crises during the 1980s raised the question: are central banks efficient in overseeing banks and is there a requirement for integrated supervision, either under the central bank or separate? The debate among academics and policymakers has never been settled without the guarantee that one alternative will ensure optimal bank supervision. This development has led to periodic changes in the form of supervision chosen. As the basic economic choice has been unsatisfactory, this study approaches the problem using path-dependence theory, which observes historical factors of bank development as well as the constellation of domestic politics in choosing these alternatives.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali