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Detail
ArtikelThe Supply of Information by A Concerned Expert  
Oleh: Caplin, Andrew ; Leahy, John
Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 114 no. 497 (Jul. 2004), page 487-505.
Topik: supply; supply; information; expert
Fulltext: 487.pdf (207.27KB)
Ketersediaan
  • Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi)
    • Nomor Panggil: EE28.14
    • Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0)
    • Tandon: tidak ada
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Isi artikelHow much information should a policy maker pass on to an ill - informed citizen ? In this paper, we address this classic question of in a setting in which beliefs impact utility, as in . We show that this question cannot be answered using a utility function with standard revealed preference foundations. To solve the model, we go beyond the classical model in two respects, relying on the psychological expected utility model of to capture preferences, and the psychological game model of to capture strategic interactions.
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