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Detail
ArtikelPersistent Court Corruption  
Oleh: Bond, Philip
Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 118 no. 531 (Aug. 2008), page 1333.
Topik: Persistent; Court; Corruption
Fulltext: 1333.pdf (611.81KB)
Ketersediaan
  • Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi)
    • Nomor Panggil: EE28.29
    • Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0)
    • Tandon: tidak ada
    Lihat Detail Induk
Isi artikelCorruption among court officials varies widely across countries and exhibits considerable intertemporal persistence. I present a model of court corruption in which there are multiple equilibria, differentiated by corruption levels. In the model, courts provide incentives for individuals to take/abstain from certain actions. High corruption levels undermine incentive provision and necessitate larger penalties. Larger penalties in turn increase the potential bribes that a court official can collect and so attract more dishonest officials to court employment. This feedback effect generates multiple equilibria. Paying court officials wages sufficiently above the market-clearing rate can eliminate the high corruption equilibrium.
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