Anda belum login :: 01 Jul 2022 00:37 WIB
Detail
ArtikelNetwork Competition and Entry Deterrence  
Oleh: Calzada, Joan ; Valletti, Tommaso M.
Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 118 no. 531 (Aug. 2008), page 1223.
Topik: Network Competition; Entry Deterrence; Cost; Group
Fulltext: 1223.pdf (621.95KB)
Ketersediaan
  • Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi)
    • Nomor Panggil: EE28.29
    • Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0)
    • Tandon: tidak ada
    Lihat Detail Induk
Isi artikelWe develop a model of logit demand that extends the traditional duopoly framework of network competition to a multi-firm industry. First, we show that incumbents establish the reciprocal access charge inefficiently below cost when they compete in prices but they behave efficiently if they compete in utilities. Secondly, we study how incumbents determine the industry-wide access charge under the threat of entry. We show that incumbents may accommodate all possible entrants, only a group of them, or may completely deter entry. When entry deterrence is the preferred option, incumbents distort the access charge upwards.
Opini AndaKlik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali
design
 
Process time: 0.03125 second(s)