Detail Implementation of Social Welfare Functions   Oleh:  Campbell, Donald E. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 33 no. 3 (1992), page 525-534. Topik: social welfare; implementation; social welfare; functions Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel A social welfare function f assigns to each economic environment p a continuous preorder f (p) on the space of allocations of private goods. f is implementable if for each large finite set Z the correspondence F (p) defined by selecting the set of f (p) - maximal allocations in Z is implementable. Then f is implementable only if it satisfies Arrow's independence axiom. Therefore, every implementable social welfare function is constant or dictatorial or inversely dictatorial. If f (p) is merely quasitransitive and f satisfies a basic nonimposition condition then f is oligarchical if it is implementable. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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