Detail A Moral Hazard Trap to Growth   Oleh:  Tsiddon, Daniel Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 33 no. 2 (1992), page 299-322. Topik: MORAL HAZARD; moral hazard; growth Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This paper studies the consequences of asymmetric information in the investment sector upon economic growth. In this paper the information asymmetry generates a moral hazard problem. This moral hazard problem restricts financial arrangements. It is shown that these restrictions make even the long - run competitive equilibrium income dependent upon history. This result also holds in case there is perfect capital mobility. However, when there is capital mobility, the government may be able to intervene in a Pareto improving way. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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