Detail Observable Contracts : Strategic Delegation and Cooperation   Oleh:  Fershtman, Chaim ; Judd, Kenneth L. ; Kalai, Ehud Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 32 no. 3 (1991), page 551-560. Topik: CONTRACTS; observable contracts; strategic delegation; cooperation Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel The role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented. One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In this paper we study a delegation game in which the players can use agents strategically to play on their behalf and the contracts they sign with them are common knowledge. We show that in such cases every Pareto optimal outcome of the game can become the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the delegation game. We demonstrate this result by discussing the Cournot - type duopolistic game. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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