Fund Advisor Compensation in Closed - End Funds  

Oleh:

Coles, Jeffrey L. ; Suay, Jose ; Woodbury, Denise

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 55 no. 3 (2000), page 1385-1414.
Topik: compensation; studies; investment advisors; closed and funds; compensation; statistical analysis; premiums
Fulltext: p 1385.pdf (123.25KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper examines the relation between the premium on closed - end funds and organizational features of the funds and advisor, including the compensation scheme of the investment advisor. We find that the fund premium is larger when : a. the advisor's compensation is more sensitive to fund performance b. the assets managed but he advisor are concentrated in the fund in question c. the advisor manages other funds with low compensation sensiticity to performance and with low concentration of asssets managed by the advisor, and d. the advisor's compensation contract evaluates performance relative to a benchmark

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