Paranoia and Reinforced Dogmatism Beyond Critical Rationality  

Oleh:

Rudnick, Abraham

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Philosophy of the Social Sciences vol. 33 no. 3 (Sep. 2003), page 339-350.
Topik: context of introduction; paranoia; reinforced dogmatism; relevance; testability
Fulltext: 339PSS333.pdf (64.47KB)

Isi artikel

Deviant forms of human thought may provide insight into epistemic standards, such as rationality. A comparative analysis of paranoia and reinforced dogmatism suggests that reinforced dogmatism, such as pseudo-science a-la-Popper, demonstrates a primary epistemic lack of critical rationality, that is, of testability, whereas paranoia demonstrates a lack of range of alternative statements leading secondarily to a lack of testability. This reflects the importance to both epistemology and psychiatry of epistemic standards in addition to testability, such as relevance to problems, and emphasizes the distinction of the context of introduction from the contexts of discovery and of justification.

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