Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in The Samaritan’s Dilemma  

Oleh:

Lagerlof, Johan

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 114 no. 492 (Jan. 2004), page 55-68.
Topik: common dilemma; efficiency; enhancing; signalling; samaritan's dilemma
Fulltext: 55.pdf (174.78KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.12 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

Suppose an altruistic person, A, is willing to transfer resources to a second person, B, if B comes upon hard times. If B anticipates that A will act in this manner, B will save too little from both agents’ point of view. This is the Samaritan's dilemma. This paper shows that the undersaving result is mitigated if we relax the standard assumption of complete information, because if A is uncertain about how big B's need for support is, B will have an incentive to signal that he is in great need by saving more than he otherwise would have done.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali