Asymmetric Information, Occupational Choice and Government Policy  

Oleh:

Parker, Simon C.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 113 no. 490 (2003), page 861-882.
Topik: INFORMATION; asymmetric information; occupational choice; government policy
Fulltext: 861.pdf (178.55KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.11 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

A model of credit markets under asymmetric information is proposed in which individuals differ in abilities that are valued in both entrepreneurship and paid employment. Unlike the heterogeneous ability model of de , over -investment is not inevitable : under - investment and credit rationing can occur instead. This result depends on the novel possibility of there being greater separation of types in paid employment than in entrepreneurship. The model allows individuals to be monitored in both occupations, and permits derivation of the conditions under which the novel possibility holds. The role of corrective government policies is also discussed.

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