Detail Coming over the horizon   Oleh:  The Economist (Editor) Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Economist (http://search.proquest.com/) vol. 382 no. 8510 (2007), page 26. Topik: Asia; China Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE29.41 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel Why China wants a bigger navy. CHINA'S President Hu Jintao is seldom seen wearing military green. So when he does, the armed forces pay attention. America and countries around Asia also had cause to sit up and take notice when Mr Hu appeared in military attire on December 27th to declare that China had to build a powerful navy and "make sound preparations for military struggles". The official summary of Mr Hu's remarks to a gathering of delegates to a congress of the navy's Communist Party branch provided little detail of what the president had in mind. But the tone of his remarks, his insistence that China was a maritime power and the prominence given by the official media to the speech all seem to point to China's determination to build a blue-water navy able to reach far beyond its shores. America has long fretted that China plans to project its power, not least in order to provide security for its rapidly growing imports of oil and other commodities shipped from the Middle East and Africa. A Pentagon report last year said China could maintain only a "symbolic" naval presence beyond its coast, but was interested in extending its presence to the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean. For more than eight years--partly in an effort to placate America--China has published occasional white papers outlining its military posture. But the latest, published two days after Mr Hu's speech, does little to cast light on China's intentions. It does not mention, for example, that China is developing an aircraft carrier, as the Pentagon suspects. Nor does the white paper discuss any of China's considerable purchases of advanced weaponry from Russia in recent years, mainly for its navy and air force. This includes destroyers, submarines, sea-skimming anti-ship missiles and fighter jets. Quite how this spending spree conforms with the document's assertion that China's security environment "remains sound" is not explained. Among the "security challenges" that China does spell out is Taiwan's "radical policy" of pursuing formal independence from China, which it says threatens stability across the Asia-Pacific region (Taiwan admits to no such aim, even though its leaders are sympathetic to it). Still, despite its military build-up, including the deployment of hundreds of missiles on the coast facing Taiwan, China has muted its bellicosity. Its previous defence white paper in 2004 threatened to crush "resolutely and thoroughly" any major move towards independence by Taiwan, "at any cost". That threat is not repeated. Mr Hu appears far more confident now than he did two years ago that Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian lacks the political strength and daring necessary to sever the island's constitutional links with the mainland. Mr Chen has openly toyed with the idea of constitutional change. But America's warnings against it (for fear of being dragged into a war with China) and a lack of public appetite for confrontation appear to be restraining him. In a speech on January 1st, Mr Chen spoke of the "myth" of one China and said only the people of Taiwan had the right to decide their future. But he did not set out any plans to rewrite the constitution accordingly. The following day Mr Hu said China would "not compromise on Taiwan independence". He also said that it would never give up its efforts to reunify the country peacefully. There is likely to be turbulence in Taiwanese politics as it prepares for parliamentary elections at the end of this year and presidential polls early in 2008, but Mr Hu is staying calm. Even Mr Chen, who normally worries that the island's increasingly close economic ties with China might compromise its security, has relaxed a little. On December 29th Taiwan announced the easing of its restriction on technology used by Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturers operating in China. It is not a big gesture. The more advanced process permitted under the new rule is already being used by Chinese competitors, Taiwanese officials say. For all the suspicions between China and America, the last year has seen a continuing thaw in their military relationship. This was all but frozen in 2001 after a collision between a Chinese fighter and an American spy-plane. But in July General Guo Boxiong, China's most senior officer, paid the highest-level visit to America by a Chinese serviceman since that incident. Moreover the American and Chinese navies, including destroyers and aircraft, staged their first ever joint search-and-rescue manoeuvres in September off Hawaii and in November in the South China Sea. American officials brushed off an incident in October when a Chinese submarine, apparently unexpectedly, surfaced close to an American aircraft carrier near the Japanese island of Okinawa. So why is Mr Hu, who has been commander-in-chief since 2004, so keen on a bigger navy? Prestige could well be part of it. Chinese state-run television aired (twice, in November and December) an unusual documentary series called "The Rise of Great Nations". It described, with a remarkable lack of the usual anti-Western tone, how Japan and various Western countries including America and Britain became strong. Naval power was a vital ingredient, the programmes suggested. A recent report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argued that since China's rapid economic growth in the past three decades had been concentrated in coastal areas, China now had long-range maritime interests. As a result, the country was in the process of changing from a continental land power into a sea power. Expect to see more of that green outfit. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

Copyright © 2006, 2007 Unika Atma Jaya, all rights reserved