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The Dilemma of Social Democracy in 1914 Chauvinism or Social Dilemme?
Oleh:
Herreros, Francisco
Jenis:
Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi:
Rationality and Society vol. 15 no. 3 (Agu. 2003)
,
page 325-344.
Topik:
chauvinism
;
coordination game
;
internationalism
;
social democracy
;
trust
Fulltext:
325RS153.pdf
(571.87KB)
Isi artikel
In 1914, socialist parties voted in favour of war credits. This was a surprising decision given their pre-war commitment to the keeping of peace. The decision has usually been explained by the so-called chauvinist preferences of the socialist leaders. In this article, an alternative hypothesis is advanced. A game theoretic model is used to explain why socialist parties betrayed their pre-war commitments. It is maintained that the socialist parties' voting decision is compatible with paci®st preferences. The game theoretic model indicates that socialist parties were trapped in a coordination problem that they could not solve. They voted in favour of war credits even though they were paci®sts because they could not coordinate themselves in a joint negative vote. This conclusion goes against the common perception of historical fact.
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