When Financial Institutions Are Large Shareholders : The Role of Macro Corporate Governance Environments  

Oleh:

Donghui Li ; Moshirian, Fariborz ; Pham, Peter Kien ; Zein, Jason

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 61 no. 6 (Des. 2006), page 2975-3008.
Topik: FINANCIAL; studies; financial institutions; stockholders; corporate governance; many countries; comparative analysis
Fulltext: p 2975.pdf (206.92KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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While financial institutions' aggregate investments have grown substantially worldwide, the size of their individual share holdings, and ultimately their incentive to monitor, may be limited by the free rider problem, regulations and a preference for diversification and liquidity. We compare institutions' shareholding patterns across countries and find vast differences in the extent to which they are large shareholders. These variations are largely determined by macro corporate disclosure requirements. This suggests that strong governance environments act to strengthen monitoring ability such that more institutions are encourgared to hold concentrated equity positions.

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