Does The Contribution of Corporate Cash Holdings And Dividends to Firm Value Depend on Governance ? A Cross Country Analysis  

Oleh:

Pinkowitz, Lee ; Stulz, Rene ; Williamson, Rohan

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 61 no. 6 (Des. 2006), page 2725-2752.
Topik: GOVERNANCE; studies; agency theory; corporate governance; investors; cash; financial performance; correlation analysis; mathematical models; shareholders rights
Fulltext: p 2725.pdf (194.22KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Agency theories predict that the value of corporate cash holdings is less in countries with poor investor protection because of the greater ability of controlling share holders to extract private benefits from cash holdings in such countries. Using various specifications of the valuation regressions of fama and french (1998), we find that the relation between cash holdings and firm value is much weaker in countries with poor investor protection than in other countries. In further support of the importance of agency theories, the relation between dividends and firm value is weaker in countries with stronger investor protection.

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