Profiling in Bargaining Over College Tuition  

Oleh:

Epple, Dennis ; Romano, Richard ; Sarpca, Sinan ; Sieg, Holger

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 116 no. 515 (2006), page F459-F479.
Topik: Collective bargaining; bargaining; college tuition
Fulltext: F459.pdf (593.83KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.23 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Profiling in college admissions arises when applicant attributes are given weight because they are correlated with unobservable student characteristics that the college values. The article models the admission process of a single college as a bargaining game between the college and a potential student with sequential moves and asymmetric information. We test the empirical implications of this model using a unique data set from a private college in the US. We find that the empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that signalling and profiling are important aspects of the college admission process.

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