Business Groups And Tunelling : Evidence From Private Securities Offerings By Korean Chaebols  

Oleh:

Jae-Seung Baek ; Jun-Koo Kang ; Inmoo, Lee

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 61 no. 5 (Okt. 2006), page 2415-2450.
Topik: BUSINESS; studies; conglomerates; rates of return; stock prices; economic models; securities trading; multivariate analysis
Fulltext: p 2415.pdf (280.76KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

We examine whether equity linked private securities offerings are used as a mechanism for tunneling among firms that belong to a korean chable. We find that chaebol issuers involved in intragroup deals set the offering prives to benefit their controlling shareholders. We also find that achaebol issuers (member acquirers) realize an 8,8% (5,8%) higher (lower) announcement return than do other types of issuers (acquires) if they sell private securities at a premium to other member firms and if the controlling shareholders receive positive net gains from equity ownership in issuers and acquires. These results are consistent with tunneling within business groups.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali