Detail The Value of Commitment With Imperfect Observability and Private Information   Oleh:  Maggi, Giovanni Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 30 no. 4 (1999), page 555-574. Topik: commitment; value of commitment; observability; private information Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.7 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel The idea that commitment is valuable plays a key role in many economic models. However, Bagwell (1995) has shown that commitment may have no value if there is (even a slight) noise in the observation of the leader's action, thus casting doubt on the notion that commitment has strategic value. Here I reconsider the commitment story in a model where the leader's action is imperfectly observed and the leader has private information, and I examine how it is affected by uncertainty about the leader's type and by the observation noise. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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