Detail Auctions With Downstream Interaction Among Buyers   Oleh:  Moldovanu, Benny ; Jehiel, Philippe Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 31 no. 4 (2000), page 768-791. Topik: buyer; auction; downstream interaction; buyers Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We study an auction whose outcome influences the future interaction among agents. The impact of that interaction on agent is assumed to be a function of all agents' types (which are private information at the time of the auction). Explicit illustrations treat auctions of patents and takeover contests. We derive equilibria for second - price, sealed - bid auctions in which the seller sometimes keeps the object, and we point out the various effects caused by positive and negative impacts. We also study the effect of reserve prices and entry fees on the seller's revenue and on welfare. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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