Detail Customer Poaching and Brand Switching   Oleh:  Tirole, Jean ; Fudenberg, Drew Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 31 no. 4 (2000), page 634-657. Topik: customer; customer poaching; brand switching Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel Firms sometimes try to "poach" the customers of their competitors by offering them inducements to switch. We analyze duopoly poaching under both short - term and long-term contracts assuming either that each consumer's brand preferences are fixed over time or that preferences are independent over time. With fixed preferences, short - term contracts lead to poaching and socially inefficient switching. The equilibrium with long - term contracts has less switching than when only short - term contracts are feasible, and it involves the sale of both short - term and long-term contracts. With independent preferences, short - term contracts are efficient, but long - term contracts lead to inefficiently little switching. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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