Detail An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing   Oleh:  Klemperer, Paul ; Gilbert, Richard J. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 31 no. 1 (2000), page 1-21. Topik: equilibrium; equilibrium theory; rationing Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel Committing to prices that result in rationing may be more profitable than setting market - clearing prices if customers must make sunk investments to enter the market. Rationing is ex post inefficient, but it gives more surplus to lower - value customers who are the marginal consumers the monopolists want to tempt to make investments. Similarly, a monopsonist may procure some requirements from high-cost "second sources" rather than purchase only from the lowest - cost suppliers. The model contributes to the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, and it may also help explain "efficiency wages," "second prizes," and "fair" behaviour. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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