Detail Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives   Oleh:  Cornelli, Francesca ; Schankerman, Mark Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 30 no. 2 (1999), page 197-213. Topik: PATENTS; patent renewals; R & D incentives Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel In a model with moral hazard and asymmetric information, we show that it can be welfare improving to differentiate patent lives when firms have different R & D productivities. A uniform patent life provides too much R & D incentive to low - productivity firms and too little to high - productivity ones. The optimally differentiated patent scheme can be implemented through a menu of patent lives (or renewals) and associated fees. We characterize the optimal mechanism and use simulation analysis to compare it with existing patent renewal systems and to illustrate the potential welfare gains from the optimal policy. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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