Detail Monitoring The Principal With Multiple Agents   Oleh:  Romano, Richard E. ; Gupta, Srabana Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 29 no. 2 (1998), page 427-442. Topik: AGENT; monitoring; principal; multiple agent Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel Double moral hazard arises in the principal - agent model when both parties provide a nonverifiable input following contracting. Balanced - budget contracts are generally second best. If the principal's input is public to two agents, which often characterizes franchising, for example, then balanced - budget contracts exist that resolve fully double moral hazard. Agent payoffs depend on both outputs to correct principal moral hazard, rather than correlation in random effects on outputs. The equilibrium in first - best choices implemented by the contract is also unique and coalition - proof. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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