Detail Signalling and Adaptive Learning in An Entry Limit Pricing Game   Oleh:  Cooper, David J. ; Kagel, John H. ; Garvin, Susan Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 28 no. 4 (1997), page 662-683. Topik: ECONOMIC MODELS; signalling; adaptive learning; limit pricing game Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel In an experimental investigation of milgrom and roberts' (1982) model, play consistenly converges to a unique equilibrium, providing evidence of sophisticated strategic behaviour that the theory predicts. Play starts with monopolists at their myopic maxima, followed by an attempt to pool, and then (if no pooling equilibrium exists) separation, suggesting myopia rather than a forward - looking process. When both pure - strategy pooling and separating equilibria exist, equilibrium seletion is a function of the past hisotry of play. An adaptive learning model characterizes the major feature of the data and provides predictions of intermediate - term behaviour that is otherwise lacking in the theory. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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