Detail Auditing Without Commitment   Oleh:  Khalil, Fahad Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 28 no. 4 (1997), page 629-640. Topik: AUDITING; auditing; commitment Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel I study the optimal contract when a principal cannot commit to an audit policy. The contract must provide incentives for the agent to comply as well as for the principal to audit. The key tradeoff is efficiency versus non compliance instead of the familiar rent versus efficiency. Information rent is zero whether production cost is high or low. For high production cost, the agent is asked to produce greater than the amount under full information. The probability of audit is higher when the principal cannot commit compared to when he can. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

Copyright © 2006, 2007 Unika Atma Jaya, all rights reserved