Detail One Smart Agent   Oleh:  Sutton, John Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 28 no. 4 (1997), page 605-628. Topik: AGENT; smart agent Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This paper propose an equilibrium concept for a class of games in which players make irresible costly decisions, these games have been widely used in the recent industrial organization literature. The equilibrium concept is defined, not in the space of strategies, but in the space of (observable) outcomes. It is weaker than perfect nash equilibrium, and it involves combining a form of "survivor principle' with an assumption about entry. This assumption involves only a very weak rationality requirement : if a profitable opportunity exists in the market, there is "one smart agent" who will fill it. This weak equilibrium concept is sufficient to imply some empirically interesting regularities in the area of market structure. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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