Large Shareholders, Private Benefits of Control, and Optimal Schemes of Privatization  

Oleh:

Cornelli, Francesca ; Li, David D.

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 28 no. 4 (1997), page 585-604.
Topik: shareholders; large shareholders; private benefits; control; optimal schemes; privatization

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We analyze optimal schemes for privatization of state enterprises when foreign investors are potential buyers. The highest bidders may not be the best large shareholdres for the state enterprise, since their bid may reflect only their high private benefit of control. The government finds itself facing a tradeoff between trying to obtain the highest possible payment (the "revenue" objective) and identifying the company that will operate better in the future (the "efficiency" objective). Therefore, ordinary auctions are not appropriate. Our optimal privatization schemes in many cases require the use of the number of shares sold as a crucial instrument to attract the most efficient investors.

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