Detail Colluding on Relative Prices   Oleh:  Winter, Ralph A. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 28 no. 2 (1997), page 359-371. Topik: prices; colluding; relative prices Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel Firms sometimes agree to limit the discounts they offer a class of customers i. e. they collude on the price differences across consumer classes. Why ? Courts have struck down agreements to limit discounts as violations of the laws agains pricing - fixing. Are these collusive agreements in fact efficient ? This article addresses these questions in a multi product duopoly model. Under one interpretation, the incentive to collude on relative prices can be traced to heterogeneity in consumers' time costs. Under fairly general conditions, total surplus increases with the collussion. This efficiency effect is most striking in the case where collusion raises the prices faced by all consumers over which firms compete. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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