Detail Penalizing Success in Dynamic Incentive Contacts : No Good Deed Goes Unpunished ?   Oleh:  Lewis, Tracy ; Sappington, David E. M. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 28 no. 2 (1997), page 346-358. Topik: SUCCESS; penalizing success; incentive contracts; unpunished Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We examine optimal dynamic incentive contracts when adverse election and moral hazard problems are present. We find that early success is optimally penalized in the sense that the agent who succeeds early subsequently faces a lower - powered incentive contract. Penalizing success in this manner serves to limit the agent's initial incentive to understate his ability. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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