CEO's Outside Employment Opportunities And The Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts  

Oleh:

Rajgopal, Shivaram ; Shevlin, Terry ; Zamora, Valentina

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 61 no. 4 (Agu. 2006), page 1813-1844.
Topik: employment; studies; agency theory; chief executive officers; executive compensation; performance evaluation; financial performance; careers
Fulltext: p 1813.pdf (225.69KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

Although agency theory suggests that firms should index executive compensation to remove market-wide effects (i.e. RPE) there is little evidence to support this theory. Oyer (2004, Journal of Finanace 59, 1619-1649) sodits that an absence of RPE is optimal if the CEO's reservation wages from outside employment opportunities vary with the economy's fortunes. We directly test and find support for Oyer's (2004) theory, We argue that the CEO's outside opportunities depend on this talent, as procied by the CEO's financial press visibility and his firm's industry adjusted ROA. Our results are robust to alternate explanations such as managerial skimming, oligopoly, and asymmetric benchmarking.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali