Capital Structure With Countervailling Incentives  

Oleh:

Spiegel, Yossef ; Spulberg, Daniel F.

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 28 no. 1 (1997), page 1-24.
Topik: capital structure; capital structure; countervailing incentives
Fulltext: 1.pdf (495.29KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

The regulated firm's choice of capital structure is affected by countervailing incentives : the firm wishes to signal high value to capital markets to boost its market value while also signalling high cost to regulators to induce rate increases. When the firm's investment is large. countervailing incentives lead both high - and low - cost firms to choose the same capital structure in equilibrium, thus decoupling capital strucutre from private information. When investment is small or medium - sized, the model may admit separating equilibria in which high -costs firms issue greater equity and low- cost firms rely more on debt financing.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali