Entry and Strategic Information Display in Credit Markets  

Oleh:

Degryse, Hans ; Bouckaert, Jan

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 116 no. 513 (2006), page 702-720.
Topik: Strategic Information; entry; strategic information; credit markets
Fulltext: 702.pdf (159.14KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: Double, EE28.22 Non-tandon: 2 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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In many countries, lenders voluntarily provide information about their borrowers to private credit registries. A recent World Bank survey reveals that the display of a lender's own borrower information is often not reciprocated. That is, access to these registries does not require the prior provision of proprietary data. We argue that incumbent lenders release information about a portion of their profitable borrowers for strategic reasons. The reasoning is that the pool of unreleased borrowers becomes characterised by a severe adverse selection problem. This prevents the entrants from bidding for all the incumbent's profitable borrowers and reduces their scale of entry.

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