CEO Overconfidence And Corporate Investment  

Oleh:

Tate, Geoffrey ; Malmendier, Ulrike

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 60 no. 6 (Dec. 2005), page 2661-2700.
Topik: ceo; chief executive officers; investment policy; impact analysis; studies; financial performance; corporate finance
Fulltext: p 2661.pdf (212.46KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investments when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company - specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity - dependent firms.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali