Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments : Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency  

Oleh:

Unel, Bulent ; Putterman, Louis ; Page, Talbot

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 115 no. 506 (Oct. 2005), page 1032-1053.
Topik: voluntary disclosure; voluntary association; public goods; reciprocity; mimicry; efficiency
Fulltext: 1032.pdf (316.17KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.19 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

We find that a process of voluntary association where individuals express a preference about whom they want to be associated with can create strong incentives to increase efficiency and contributions in provision of a public good. This process of endogenous group formation perfectly sorted contributions by the order of group formation. Comparison of middle and last period behaviour suggests that a majority of the subject population are conditional cooperators, with a minority of monetary payoff maximisers. The experiment illustrates that under favourable conditions, where the opportunities of entry and exit are symmetrically balanced, a process of voluntary association can mitigate the free - rider problem.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali