Joint Liability Lending and The Peer Selection Effect  

Oleh:

Gangopdhyay, Shubhashis ; Lensink, Robert ; Ghatak, Maitreesh

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 115 no. 506 (Oct. 2005), page 1005-1015.
Topik: peers; jont liability; lending; peer selection effect
Fulltext: 1005.pdf (108.97KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.19 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in violate an ex post incentive - compatibility constraint which says that the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterise optimal separating joint liability contracts incorporating this constraint.

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