Fair Pay and A Wage-Bill Argument for Low Real Wage Cyclicality and Excessive Employment Variability  

Oleh:

Thomas, Jonathan P.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 115 no. 506 (Oct. 2005), page 833-859.
Topik: wage; fair pay; wage - bill argument; wage cyclicality; employment variability
Fulltext: 833.pdf (253.35KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.19 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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This article considers a two - period optimal contracting model in which firms make new hires in the second period subject to the constraint that they cannot pay discriminate either against or in favour of the new hires. In the absence of fully contingent contracts, it is shown that wages are less flexible than needed for efficient employment levels, with the result that too few hires are made in bad states of the world. Unemployment is involuntary. In an extension to the model, there may also be involuntary and excessive layoffs in some states of the world.

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