Producing and Manipulating Information  

Oleh:

Dur, Robert ; Swank, Otto H.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 115 no. 500 (Jan. 2005), page 185-199.
Topik: INFORMATION; producing; manipulating information
Fulltext: 185.pdf (116.33KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.16 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper studies the selection of information collecting agents by policy makers in the light of two agency problems. First, it is often hard to ascertain how much effort agents have put in acquiring information. Second, when agents have an interest in the policy outcome, they may manipulate information. We show that unbiased advisers put highest effort in collecting information. Eliminating manipulation of information, however, requires that the preferences of the policy maker and the adviser be aligned. Therefore, policy makers appoint advisers with preferences that are less extreme than their own.

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