Trade Generation, Reputation, And Sell - Side Analysts  

Oleh:

Jackson, Andrew R.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 60 no. 2 (Apr. 2005), page 673-719.
Topik: generation; studies; reputations; mathematical models; investment advisors; accuracy; conflicts of Interest
Fulltext: p 673.pdf (279.82KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper examines the trade-generation and reputation - building incentives facing sell - side analysts. Using a unique data set I demonstrate that optimistic analysts generate more trade for their brokerage firms, as do high reputation analysts. I also find that accurate analysts generate higher reputations. The analyst therefore faces a conflict between telling the truth to build her reputation versus misleading investors via optimistic forecasts to generate short - term increases in trading commissions. In equilibrium I show forecast optimism can exist, even when investment - banking affiliations are removed. The conclusions may have important policy implications given recent changes in the institutional structure of the brokerage industry.

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