Regulation With Wage Bargaining  

Oleh:

Dalen, Dag Morten ; Fehr, Nils-Henrik M von der ; Moen, Espen R.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 113 no. 487 (2003), page 525-538.
Topik: REGULATION; regulation; wage bargaining
Fulltext: 525.pdf (112.64KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.10 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

In many regulated industries labour unions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent - sharing. In this paper, we study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. A seemingly robust conclusion, at least when worker bargaining power is considerable, is that incentives for cost efficiency should be stronger than in the standard case in which wages do not depend on the regulatory regime.

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