Reason With Me: ‘Confabulation’ and Interpersonal Moral Reasoning  

Oleh:

Nyholm, Sven

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethical Perspectives: Journal of the European Ethics Network vol. 22 no. 2 (Jun. 2015), page 315-332.
Topik: Social intutitionist model; rationalism; moral reasoning; virtue; respect

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE45 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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According to Haidt’s ‘social intuitionist model’, empirical moral psychology supports the following conclusion: intuition comes first, strategic reasoning second. Critics have responded by arguing that intuitions can depend on non-conscious reasons, that not being able to articulate one’s reasons does not entail not being responsive to reasons, and that the relations between intuitions and reasoning can be truth-tracking and principled in ways overlooked by Haidt. This debate involves a false dichotomy: that either reasoning is truth-tracking, or else our reasoning is purely strategic and manipulative in nature. Reason-giving also, I argue, performs other important functions in moral and social life. A robust willingness to offer reasons in favour of our convictions is itself a virtue we seek and appreciate in others. Others’ willingness to reason with us is itself a good we enjoy at their hands, or that they confer upon us. What we give each other in being willing and determined to reason together is, among other things, respect for, and good-will towards, each other.

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