If Killing Isn't Wrong, Then Nothing Is. A Naturalistic Defence of Basic Moral Certainty  

Oleh:

Pleasants, Nigel

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethical Perspectives: Journal of the European Ethics Network vol. 22 no. 1 (Mar. 2015), page 197-215.
Topik: Wittgenstein; moral certainty; wrongness of killing

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE45 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This article develops and defends the Wittgensteinian idea of basic moral certainty that I advanced in earlier writings. It seeks to defend the core of this idea against criticisms issued by those who are appreciative of Wittgenstein’s analysis of empirical certainty, but who argue that moral certainty is significantly disanalogous to empirical certainty. They maintain that there are no universal moral certainties, only localised (hence relative) certainties embedded in culturally and historically specific moral ‘language-games’. In response to these criticisms I argue for the universality and naturalism of basic moral certainty, focusing on the central case of the wrongness of killing.

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