The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence  

Oleh:

Neumann, Manfred J. M. ; Herrendorf, Berthold

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 113 no. 484 (2003), page 43-64.
Topik: central bank; inflation; labour market; distortions; central bank
Fulltext: 43.pdf (161.78KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.9 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Using the citizen - candidate model, we study the government's choice of institutions for the labor market and the central bank and derive the implications for inflation and employment. Conditions for the existence of equilibria are derived in which the labor market is distorted and the central bank is dependent or independent under a range of conditions affecting central bank dependence, the post - election cycle in inflation and employment and inflation bias. Results imply that average inflation and inflation variability are lower under an independent central bank, whereas employment variability can be lower or higher, consistent with evidence for OECD countries.

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