Reputation and The Alocation of Ownership  

Oleh:

Halonen, Maija

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 112 no. 481 (2002), page 539-558.
Topik: OWNERSHIP; reputation; alocation; ownership
Fulltext: 539.pdf (145.01KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.8 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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The allocation of ownership matters even in long - term relationships. Ownership structure is chosen to encourage co - operation. The optimal ownership structure of the static game restricts the gain from deviation to be the lowest but also the punishment will be minimal. The worst ownership structure of the one - shot game is good in the repeated setting because it provides the highest punishment but bad because the gain from deviation is also the highest. When investment is inelastic, joint ownership is optimal. Allowing for renegotiation of ownership structure softens the punishment under joint ownership but it is still optimal for a wide parameter range.

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