The Perverse Effects of Partial Labour Market Reform : Fixed-Term Contracts in France  

Oleh:

Blanchard, Olivier ; Landier, Augustin

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 112 no. 480 (2002), page F214-F244.
Topik: labour market; labour market; fixed - term; contracts
Fulltext: F214.pdf (961.72KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.9 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We argue that the effects of a partial reform of employment protection by allowing firms to hire workers on fixed - term contracts may be perverse. The main effect may be high turnover in entry - level jobs, leading to higher, not lower, unemployment. Even if unemployment falls, workers may be worse off, going through many spells of unemployment and entry - level jobs, before obtaining a regular job. Considering French data for young workers since the early 1980s, we conclude that the reforms have substantially increased turnover, without a substantial reduction in unemployment duration. If anything, the effect on their welfare appears to have been negative.

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