Why Care for the Severely Disabled? A Critique of MacIntyre’s Account  

Oleh:

Poore, Gregory S.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy vol. 39 no. 4 (Aug. 2014), page 459-473 .
Topik: Alasdair MacIntyre; dependent rational animals; disability; Wendell Berry

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: MM80 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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In Dependent Rational Animals, Alasdair MacIntyre attempts to ground the virtues in a biological account of humans. Drawing from this attempt, he also tries to answer the question of why we should care for the severely disabled. MacIntyre’s difficulty in answering this question begins with the fact that his communities of practices do not naturally include the severely disabled within their membership and care. In response to this difficulty, he provides four reasons for why we should care for the severely disabled. I argue that three of these reasons are inadequate, and that the fourth is incomplete although it does point in a promising direction. I conclude that a more satisfactory answer requires a further extension of the central development from After Virtue to Dependent Rational Animals, and I draw from Wendell Berry, whose work MacIntyre admires, to provide an illuminating illustration of what such an answer might look like.

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