Is The International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable ?  

Oleh:

Acharya, Viral V.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 58 no. 6 (2003), page 2745-2782.
Topik: REGULATION; studies; capital requirements; convergence; regulation of financial; institutions; central banks; competitive advantage; economic theory; mathematical models
Fulltext: p 2745.pdf (312.72KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

The merit of international convergence of bank capital requirements in the presence of divergent closure policies of different central banks is examined. The lack of a complementary variation between minimum bank capital requirements and regulatory forbearance leads to a spillover from more forbearing to loess forbearing economies and reduces the competitive advantage of banks in less forebearing economies. Linking the central bank's forbearance to its alignment with domestic bank owners, it is shown that in equilibrium, a regression toward the worst closure policy may result ? The central banks of initially less forbearin economies also adopt greater forbearance.

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