Institutional Investors And Executive Compensation  

Oleh:

Starks, Laura T. ; Hartzell, Jay C.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 58 no. 6 (2003), page 2351-2374.
Topik: investors; studies; institutional investments; executive compensation; agency theory; pay for performance; shareholder relations
Fulltext: p 2351.pdf (199.12KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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We find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay - for - performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, even after controlling for firm sie, industry, investment opportunities and performance. These results suggest that the institutions serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Additionally, we find that clientele effects exist among institutions for firms with certain compensation structures, suggesting that institutions also influence compensation strucutres through their preferences.

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