Unemployment and The 'Labour-Management Conspiracy'  

Oleh:

Karp, Larry ; Paul, Thierry

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 110 no. 460 (2000), page 113-135.
Topik: Unemployment; unemployment; labour - management; conspiracy
Fulltext: 113.pdf (324.95KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We study a model in which management and a union bargain over a rule that will later determine the level of employment, and over a wage. The government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy. An exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionised sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage. Government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour, because of the induced change in the endogenous wage. Unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a `labour - management conspiracy'.

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