High - Water Marks And Hedge Fung Management Contracts  

Oleh:

Ross, Stephen A. ; Goetzmann, William N. ; Ingersoll, Jonathan E., [Jr.]

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 58 no. 4 (2003), page 1685-1717.
Topik: water; hedge funds; investment advisors; compensation; rates of return; studies; mathematical models
Fulltext: p 1685.pdf (264.54KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Incentive fees for money managers are frequently accompanied by high - water mark provisions that condition the payment of the performance fee upon exceeding the previously achieved maximum share value. In this paper, we show that hedge fund performance fees are valuable to money managers, and conversely, represent a claim on a significant proportion of investor wealth. the high - water mark provisions in these contracts limit the value of the performance fees. We provide a closed - form solution to the cost of the high-water mark contract under certain conditions. Our results provide a framework for valuation of a hedge fund management company.

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